The Possibility of Inefficient Corporate Contracts

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The Possibility of Inefficient Corporate Contracts

In this article, I challenge the belief that corporate contracts are inherently efficient, demonstrating how asymmetric information between parties can lead to inefficient signaling behaviors.

Ian Ayres

Jul 10, 2025

∙ Paid

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https://ianayres.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/The%20Possibility%20of%20Inefficient%20Corporate%20Contracts.pdf

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